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 consociational democracy is a 
model of governance that uses 
power sharing to cope with societal 
divisions. Lijphart (1996: 258) outlined four 
crucial, interdependent elements, which 
characterise consociationalism: “Grand 
Coalition” governments in which members of 
all significant linguistic and religious 
minorities are represented, cultural autonomy 
for minorities groups, proportional political 
representation and an effective minority veto. 
India’s characterisation as a consociational 
democracy has been both convincingly 
reinforced and criticised. Much of this 
analysis, however, focuses too much on 
contingent political realities rather than 
entrenched and effective institutional pillars 
from which they in part derive. Using 
Lijphart’s (1996) understanding of 
consociational, this paper demonstrates that 
while India’s political system runs on the basis 
of an informal consociationalism, relying on 
the inclusive Congress Party, India’s 
constitution fails to adhere to any of the 
principles of consociationalism effectively. 
This is because the drafters of the Indian 
constitution integrated the contradictions and 
debates in society, such as the divide between 
Hindu majoritarianism and the 
consociationalism of the minority groups and 
the Congress Party into the Indian institutional 
structure and constitutional law. This, 
however, has resulted in the majoritarian 
tenets in the constitution such as the first-past-
the-post- electoral system undermining its 
more consociational elements. Furthermore by 
favouring regionally concentrated ethno-
linguistic groups, the system allows 
consociational benefits to regional majorities 
failing to protect regional minorities, which 
include thinly dispersed national minorities. 
This ambiguous, unbalanced constitutional 
combination of majoritarianism and 
consociationalism is ineffective, hindering the 
A 
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establishment of comprehensive 
consociationalism in the country.  
It is necessary, firstly, to outline the 
purpose of consociationalism and how it 
relates to the democratic process in India. 
Consociationalism aims to mitigate conflicts 
in ‘deeply divided societies’, defined by 
Lerner as when divisions are founded on 
irreconcilable visions of the state (Lerner 
2010: 70). Constitutions are vital tools in the 
achievement of this because as an expression 
of ‘who belongs’ and as the basis of a state’s 
distribution of power and liberty, they can 
facilitate or fuel the prevalent divisions within 
society. The divisions in India are multi-
faceted, compartmentalising the country on 
different levels along lines of religion, 
language, geography, caste and ethnicity. 
These divisions are broadly characterised by 
one political schism, that is, between Hindu 
majoritarianism and consociationalism. The 
framers of the 1949 Indian constitution 
adopted an incrementalist approach to 
constitution writing and chose to import this 
conflict into the constitution through 
institutional ambiguity and contradictions 
seen, for example, in the establishment of an 
unenforceable Uniform Civil Code (Lerner 
2010: 76). By doing this they transferred 
decisions to future political realms in an India 
with a more certain, consolidated identity, 
which they thought may be better placed to 
make decisions on issues of national identity. 
According to consociational theory, a 
democracy with such schisms can only 
survive according to its model (Lijphart 1996: 
258). Yet, as much as a deeply divided 
democracy relies on consociationalism, 
consociationalism also relies on democracy to 
function. For instance, the tools of 
consociationalism such as proportionality 
representation are inherently democratic. 
Moreover, cultural autonomy and a minority 
veto are predicated on the existence of a 
federal, democratic mechanism to articulate 
concerns and reject proposals.  
The criterion of proportionality in 
representation and government employment is 
the most fundamental measure of 
consociationalism as it directly enforces 
power sharing. The Indian Constitution, 
however, is at most ambivalently supportive 
of proportionality as it fails to acknowledge 
and act according to the multifaceted nature of 
the ‘Indian’ identity and it is consequently 
inconsistently implemented.  An example is 
Article 330 that allows for positive 
discrimination in favour of lower castes in the 
form of proportional reservations in political 
representation and government appointments. 
This article is deeply consociational, giving 
less privileged segments of society 
proportional representation and power. Yet, 
the “colour blind” Constitution is oblivious to 
the fundamental religious divide between 
Hindus and Muslims and the minority status 
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of the latter. The lack of reservations for 
Muslims has left them with a significantly 
lower presence in government and civil 
services than the principle of proportionality 
would require. After the 2009 General 
Election there were only 28 Muslim MPs, 
which is less than 39% than their proportional 
share of 13% (Ansari 2009). This under -
representation has been a historical trend. 
Muslim MPs have on average been allocated 
only 53% of their proportional share in the last 
14 Lok Sabhas. Furthermore, Muslims 
amounted to only 2.8% of the recommended 
candidates for civil service jobs after the 2012 
exams (Zaidi, 2014: 23). This, however, may 
not be the result of discrimination in 
recruitment as the applicants from largely 
Muslim universities in Zaidi’s sample have 
over double the rate of success in comparison 
to the Hindus (2014: 24). Zaidi found instead 
that community factors such as low female 
participation as well as structural factors such 
as the cycle of poor education explained the 
lack of Muslim applicants (2014: 25). This 
could indicate structural discrimination in 
education, which a consociational constitution 
would seek to address, for example, through 
the use of reservations. Even if admission into 
the civil service and the legislature is not 
being denied to Muslims, the figures above 
show that proportionality is only formally 
entrenched in relation to a select few 
minorities.  
While proportional elements in India’s 
institutions are lacking, some elements of the 
institutional set up in India directly contradict 
the criterion of proportionality. For instance, 
the constitution adopted the use of the 
majoritarian Westminster model and first-
past-the-post electoral system, which favours 
only geographically concentrated ethno-
linguistic groups. However, Lijphart has 
argued that the States Reorganisation Act in 
1956, which reconfigured state borders to 
correlate with ethno-linguistic populations, 
allowed the Indian system to “circumvent” the 
disproportionate effects of the first-past-the-
post system by manufacturing large ethnically 
defined majorities (Lijphart 1996: 261). 
However, the geographically dispersed 
Muslim population has not benefitted from 
this and now only command a legislative 
majority in one state being Jammu & 
Kashmir. The 1956 reconfiguration, therefore, 
has fostered the legislative dominance of 
densely populated Hindi speaking northern 
states (Adeney 2002: 25-26). Wilkinson 
argues, however, that Muslims and backward 
castes have become more politically valuable 
and therefore powerful as they have mobilised 
more in the wake of the Congress Party’s 
decline and multi-party competition. He 
maintains that this competition has led, to 
politicians promising and delivering economic 
and political benefits to Muslims and low 
castes for their votes (Wilkinson 2000: 781-
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782). As a consequence, Wilkinson insists, 
‘proportionality’ has been enhanced in 
government employment, political 
representation but also government spending 
but the Muslims and OBCs are still, as 
discussed above, far below their proportional 
share of representation in government 
employment. While informal political realities 
“circumvent” the constitution’s inherent 
majoritarian elements proportionality, when it 
is attempted, is uneven and is lacking formal 
entrenchment.  
Proportionality also relies on the 
existence of a grand coalition, that is, the 
inclusion of various demographic groups into 
the executive branch of government. 
However, in India, this is only guaranteed by 
the dominance of the Congress Party, which 
unlike its only genuine rival the Hindu 
majoritarian BJP, is itself a Grand Coalition 
because of its inclusivity and internal 
democracy (Lijphart 1996: 260). Being 
wedged in the ideological centre of India’s 
multi-party system has allowed the Congress 
to become the party of “historical consensus” 
as “parties of pressure” apply centripetal 
pressure that ensures that it remains at the 
“balance of effective public opinion” (Lijphart 
1996: 260; Kothari 1989: 27). This has, 
according to Lijphart, resulted in the 
proportional distribution of cabinet positions 
to all groups, which is impressive given the 
constraint of only about twenty available 
positions. As a result, Muslims are much 
better represented. In the current government, 
for instance, the Vice-president, foreign 
minister and the Director of the Intelligence 
Bureau are all Muslims. While one could 
argue that that these appointments keep 
Muslims away from the most pressing issues 
facing their community in the country such as 
the Civil Code and reservations, Wilkinson’s 
argument that Muslims are kept from the most 
powerful positions in India is clearly 
inaccurate (Wilkinson 2000: 771). 
Nevertheless, while these appointments are 
significant, it can be argued that these 
appointments only symbolise the Congress 
party’s less pervasive “top-down” rather than 
“bottom-up” representativeness (Lijphart 
1996: 264). Furthermore, this Grand Coalition 
in the cabinet seems to depend entirely on the 
currently declining Congress dominance 
rather than invulnerable constitutional laws. 
The Constitution protects the ‘Congress 
system’ in that it’s majoritarian electoral 
system favours the Congress who enjoy 
support in breadth and depth across India 
helping them gain “manufactured majorities”. 
This has been key in maintaining their 
predominance in most general elections since 
Independence. Even as the influence of the 
Congress has waned and India has become a 
more competitive multi-party democracy, the 
majoritarian electoral system has allowed the 
party to maintain enough electoral clout to
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form coalitions such as the United Progressive 
Alliance which include parties from both sides 
of the ideological spectrum. However, the 
Constitution has no bearing on the internal 
composition of Congress so it cannot be 
responsible for its internal Grand Coalition. 
Moreover, the first past- the- post system 
could easily allow Hindu majoritarianism in 
the form of the BJP to succeed as they are 
predicted to do in this year’s General Election. 
A consequence of this could well be the 
destruction of any remnant of Grand 
Coalition. The reliance on the Congress party 
for a Grand Coalition makes the latter 
contingent and vulnerable to short-term 
political changes. Replacing the first-past-the-
post system with a proportional electoral 
system might destroy Congress dominance but 
it would also necessitate inter-party Grand 
Coalitions that would be more genuinely 
consociational. Adeney suggests that unlike 
ethnically defined elites with authority over 
their communities, minority Congressmen and 
women are not pure representatives of their 
communities (Adeney 2002: 28). This may be 
a blunt characterisation but it is clear that 
‘identity parties’ would represent and mobilise 
their communities more effectively than 
internal cliques within the Congress. It seems, 
therefore, that while the institutional set up in 
India has protected the Grand Coalition that 
Congress has offered, it prevents proportional 
representation and the birth of inter-party 
Grand Coalitions where minorities would be 
more vehemently represented.  
A crucial purpose of proportionality and a 
Grand Coalition is to engender a functional 
minority veto whereby minority groups have 
the power to reject government decisions that 
affect them. This is usually in the form of an 
informal understanding like the 1965 
agreement not to adopt Hindi as the exclusive 
national language without the consent of non-
Hindi minorities. Lijphart insists that the 
minority veto works best when it isn’t 
required often (1996: 261-262). Arguably this 
is the case in India as there have been no 
legislative threats to either ethno-linguistic 
federalism or educational autonomy. In the 
cases where minority rights are threatened, the 
veto has been historically guaranteed through 
informal means. The Shah Bano case, for 
instance, which nullified the Muslim Personal 
Law against maintenance payments for 
divorced women was reversed by Parliament 
under pressure from Muslim protesters. 
However, to describe India as a 
constitutionally consociational democracy, 
formal entrenchment of the minority veto is 
required. This, however, unlike notable 
consociational states like Austria and the 
Netherlands, has not been established through 
a comprehensive agreement and is the weakest 
element of Indian constitutional 
consociationalism. Federalism has allowed 
regionally concentrated ethno-linguistic
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majorities provincial power over some 
relevant policy areas such as public services 
and the police. However,  Articles 249, 250, 
251 and 254 of the Constitution gives the 
Parliament superior legislative power and thus 
provincial laws can only be valid if they avoid 
conflict with national law. This has 
significantly restricted the legislative freedom 
of the states.  Moreover, the central 
government itself is not constitutionally 
restricted by a minority veto. Furthermore, 
ethno-linguistic federalism fails to protect the 
state minorities and the first-past-the-post 
prevents geographically dispersed minorities 
from proportional representation in the Lok 
Sabha. In comparison with Colonial India 
where the Government of India Act 1935 gave 
colonial Governors “the power to veto bills or 
even dissolve provincial assemblies if 
minorities complained of abuse by the 
majority”, Independent India cannot be said to 
have an institutionalised minority veto. 
Cultural autonomy, however, is 
marginally protected by India’s Constitution 
in three ways. Firstly, the Constituent 
Assembly that drafted India’s Constitution 
excluded an amendment that would have 
banned Separate Personal Laws concerning 
marriage, children and inheritance for Hindus, 
Muslims and Sikhs. This decision facilitated 
the 1955 Hindu Marriage Act and 1993 
Christian Marriage Act and is a notable 
success of the incrementalist constitution. 
Secondly, Article 30 states: "… All minorities, 
whether based on religion or language, shall 
have the right to establish and administer 
educational institutions of their choice" while 
also guaranteeing that public funding will be 
granted without discrimination. Thirdly, the 
establishment of ethno-linguistic federalism 
should protect the cultural autonomy of 
regional ethno-linguistic groups from threats 
to cultural diversity. However, this has been 
undermined by the invasive central 
government. Indian federalism, which was 
already limited, was debilitated further in the 
time of Indira Gandhi. Around the time of her 
rule the Presidential (direct) rule of states was 
used extensively for partisan purposes. 
Between 1968 and 1989 Presidential rule was 
invoked 66 times and consequently the 
authority of dissenting state governments was 
undermined (Lijphart 1996). Although her 
successors have been less aggressive, it is 
clear that power has not yet been disseminated 
back to the states and that therefore ethno-
linguistic federalism lacks efficacy. Yet, even 
weak federalism has led to localised 
majoritarianism. Although ethno-linguistic 
state borders may have protected regionally 
concentrated communities who became 
provincial majorities, these communities went 
on to discriminate against the minorities in the 
new states overriding constitutionally granted 
personal laws and educational autonomy 
(Wilkinson 2000: 777-778). Wilkinson used
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evidence from the Commission for Linguistic 
Minorities to show how the state government 
in Tamil Nadu has consistently refused to 
provide Hindi education despite it being a 
constitutional right (Wilkinson 2000: 778). 
Although cultural autonomy is a key part of 
the Indian Constitution and is protected in 
theory by the central government, the federal 
dimension of cultural autonomy has been 
unhelpful, failing to protect provincial 
majorities and diminishing the cultural 
autonomy of provincial minority groups.  
To conclude, it appears that India’s 
constitution fails to adhere to support any of 
the four criteria of consociationalism despite 
facilitating some elements of informal 
consociationalism. . Proportionality in 
employment and political representation is 
inconsistently enforced and applied by the 
Constitution. The majoritarian first-past-the-
post electoral system and ethno-linguistic state 
borders only help geographically concentrated 
groups as regional minorities lack veto power 
and are only given indirect representation 
through either majoritarian parties or the 
Congress. The Grand Coalition exists for now 
but without constitutional support, relying on 
the inclusive Congress, which has lost its 
historical predominance. Cultural autonomy, 
although constitutionally backed in some 
important areas, is not protected at a 
provincial level where the autonomy of ethno-
linguistic state majorities is undercut by the 
central government. Yet despite this, these 
majorities then override the cultural autonomy 
of provincial minority groups. India cannot, 
therefore, be conceived as consociational on a 
constitutional basis. The future of Indian 
consociationalism is, however, less certain. 
While it is foreseeable that the dysfunctional 
elements of India’s informal 
consociationalism will die if the Hindu 
nationalist BJP come to power this year, 
Lerner argues that India’s incrementalist 
approach to constitution writing may lead to 
more decisive consociational clarification in 
the future (Lerner 2010: 76-77).
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